MyStratWeekly
Market views and strategy

This document is intended for professional clients in accordance with MIFID
N° 001 // **7 December 2020**

Topic of the week: The return of inflation?

- **A rapid progression of monetary aggregate is one of many elements that could push inflation on a higher path**
- **This scenario is absolutely not priced nor expected by the markets and could trigger sizeable movements, especially for the curve.**

Brexit : The moment of truth

- **Time is running out and divergences are strong increasing the uncertainty and the risk of a hard Brexit**
- **Significant disruptions from January 1, even with an agreement**
- **Considerable impact on British growth of a hard Brexit**

Market review: Casting doubt

- **ECB further easing expected this week**
- **US fiscal deal could be signed this week**
- **Dollar slide continues**
- **Rich valuations in high yield space**

Chart of the week



Currency is an accounting unit, a medium of exchange and a store of value. CBs have monopoly power over money issuance, which intrinsic value is tied to high-quality collateral. Purchases of risky debt securities may have undermined the intrinsic value of currency. The implied devaluation (for instance the US dollar) sparked a reach for alternatives. Whilst gold (+43% since 2018) is a well-established store of value, it cannot be used a means of transaction. Bitcoin (up 402%) is too volatile to be used as store of value but may be used to clear a reduced number of transactions. Both asset values rest mainly on their relative scarcity.

Figure of the week

100

Source : Ostrum AM

100 trillion USD. At the end of last week the world market capitalization past that mark for the first time ever according to the Bloomberg estimate. That is a 15% increase since the beginning of the year.

Stéphane Déo
Head of markets strategy

Alex Botte
Global strategist

Zouhoure Bousbih
Emerging countries strategist

Aline Goupil- Raguénès
Developed countries strategist

Topic of the week

The return of inflation?

The rapid acceleration of money aggregates could put inflation on a higher path over the medium term. This scenario is absolutely not priced nor expected by the markets and could trigger sizeable movements, especially for the curve.

We're far from it

Return of inflation? The question might sound misplaced, **European inflation for almost a decade has clearly been too low compared to ECB's target at 2%.**



Recent data are not encouraging. The November inflation numbers published last week was a -0,2% while core inflation was at 0,2%, unchanged compared to the previous month which suggests that the collapse in inflation might not be as temporary as previously though. Of course, part of the recent decline owes much to the Covid crisis and is likely to be reverted in the foreseeable future. Inflation would then trend back up, for instance, the energy component was down 8,4% in November but could print a +15 to +20% in Q2 next year if oil prices stay where they are now.

However, a rebound is bound to be most and medium-term inflation prospects remain mediocre at best. **The ECB, as well as the Fed, have inflation forecasts that are below their stated objectives.** The ECB expects inflation at 1.3% in 2020, too low compared to the 2% target meanwhile the Fed sees inflation barely reaching 2.0% in 2023, again below the target of an inflation that overshoots the 2% mark.

Finally, it is worth underlying that markets think alike with a sobering inflation outlook even though market expectations have been trending steadily up over the past month.



Against those evidences, it seems to us, however, that one should not underestimate the likelihood of a more pronounced inflation trend.

A long term approach

Our argument is daring (or foolish) as it is based on the monetarist theory of inflation which has been abundantly mocked and ridiculed of late. The skyrocketing central bank's balance sheet appears to be clearly at odds with the stubbornly low inflation prints.

Yet the theory remains empirically accurate: **money aggregate growth is consistent with inflation numbers over a long period of time.** If we turn our attention to the Euro Zone, the theory would be consistent with an average annual of 1.0% over the past decade while the GDP deflator has gained 1.2% on average over the period. Not bad at all ! Since 2005 (unfortunately the necessary details are not available before that point) the model tells 1.6% while the reality was 1.4%. That's a level of precision many economists would kill for!



Is that sheer luck? Maybe. It is however important to underline that the model performs equally well in the USA and in Japan. Since 2000, the approach concludes to 2.2% inflation in the USA while the actual print is 1.9%. In Japan the order of magnitude is also reasonable with a +0.1% forecast vs. a -0.6% actual number for inflation, again sicken 2000.

Conclusion: it would not be appropriated to put that approach in the bin. Over a long period, we are talking decades not months, there's no obvious proof that the link between money creation and inflation has been broken. On the contrary.

A bit of theory

To understand the intuition behind this approach, imagine that the money available in an economy doubles but that production does not change, eventually prices will have to adjust and will double. To be more precise, the below is the canonical equation for this theory:

$P.Y = M.V$

Nominal production (P is the price level, Y the volume of production) has to equate the monetary base (M) adjusted for the velocity of money (V).

Lately, this theory has been copiously ridiculed. The size of central banks' balance sheets has ballooned over the past decade or so while inflation, as noted above, has remained very disappointing. As a reminder the Fed's balance sheet moved from 1 Trillion in 2008 to about 7.1 lately, this is on average a 17% annual increase over the period, over three times faster than the corresponding increase in nominal GDP. On that dimension, the ECB has no reason to be ashamed with a balance sheet size that moved from 1.3 trillion euros to 6.7 trillion, a 421% increase, or 14% per annum.



However, what really matters for inflation is not the ECB's balance sheet size but the volume of liquidity available for transactions. Of course, these two aggregates are linked and tend to move in tandem. However, the proverbial "printing press" is a very misleading image. In modern economies, transaction money is not created by central banks but by commercial banks when they grant credit. This, in economists' parlance is called "the counterparty of M3": when a bank grants a loan it will appear on the asset side of its balance sheet and it will credit the current account of the customer. This increases the money aggregates. Part of these liquidities are refinanced at the central bank, hence the usual link between central bank's balance sheet and M3.

But during the last decade the two aggregates have diverged. Why? The ECB has indeed provided vast amount of liquidity to the banking system but those liquidities, to a very large extent, have been deposited back at the ECB for precautionary reasons but also for regulatory reasons. As a result, M3, which measures transaction liquidities, has been very pedestrian. **Those liquidities created by the ECB have been, to use economists' jargon "sterilized".**



The return of inflation?

The issue is that, while monetary aggregates have been very sluggish over the past decade, they have neatly accelerated since the beginning of this year. Indeed, **credit granted by European banks during the pandemic have increased at an unusually rapid pace.** This owes much to the state guarantees but also to the extremely loose monetary policy implemented. The consequence has been a sharp acceleration in Europe, as well as in the USA, of monetary aggregates.



This will not lead to a rapid increase in inflation. Monetary mechanisms are slow to feed through and gradual in their effects. Moreover, the output gap remains wide and will help maintain inflationary pressure at bay during the next few quarters as there is absolutely no signs of supply/demand imbalance yet. It is nevertheless reasonable to assume that, over the longer term, the average level of inflation could be higher than what it had been over the last decade or so.

A European inflation that averages more than 2% over the cycle, or even above 3%, seems to become a plausible hypothesis.

Markets are not prepared

That inflation dynamic might seem modest after all. And indeed, this is far from a double-digit 1980s style inflation trajectory. We would argue however that this can be largely enough to trigger significant market rotation.

The issue is that the market is not in line at all with this scenario. It does not believe it at all, even if it is worth noting that markets inflation expectations have trended upwards on both sides of the Atlantic. Inflation swap in Europe are still very low, the 30-year is current at a very pale 1.5% (it was 0.9% in March!).

Markets are not prepared for a return of inflation

In the chart below we use the inflation swap curve in the Euro Area to estimate the time needed before inflation returns to 2%. Until the middle of last decade the order of magnitude was reasonable, around two to five years. The market expectations move to ten years during the second half of the past decade and is now saying that even on a 30-year horizon, inflation will be comfortably below the 2% mark.

The market does not believe at all in the return of inflation. And it is an issue in terms of the ECB's credibility. The Fed, by contrast, is in a better place as 1-year swap spreads in four years is currently at 2.06%. The market gives the benefit of the doubt to the Fed with a return of inflation in the not that distant future.



An additional symptom of the market unpreparedness is the reaction of inflationary surprises. The Bund reaction to inflationary surprises has been unusually strong in the recent past. Of course, surprises are currently inconsequential hence the curve moves are also quite limited. But this high sensitivity of the curve suggests that even a moderated inflation scenario, such as the one we introduced above, could result in substantial curve adjustments.

Conclusion : stay prudent!

Consequences of the current crisis are far from obvious. If the short-term effects are indisputably deflationary, the reverse might be true over the longer term. The rapid progression of monetary aggregate is one of many elements that could push inflation on a higher path than the one we've been accustomed over the past two decades.

However, markets do not believe at all in this scenario. This could lead to hasty repricing. Not only for the curve but also for related asset classes. One can especially think of higher volatility and a rotation in the equity market.

Stéphane Déo

Brexit: The moment of truth

Brexit will take place on December 31 at midnight with or without a deal. Strong divergences and the very short time to reach an agreement increase the uncertainty and the risk of a hard Brexit.

It's urgent to find a deal

UK officially left the European Union on January 31, 2020 at midnight. A period of transition then began during which relations remained unchanged with the aim of reaching a trade deal. Boris Johnson has decided not to extend it and, on December 31 at midnight, Brexit will actually take place with or without a trade deal.

Negotiations are in their final stretch before the European Council on December 10 and 11. Divergences between the United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU) remain strong. They relate to three points: fishing (access conditions to British waters), conditions of fair competition, in particular as regards State aid, and governance : mechanism for settling disputes in the context of a possible trade deal. The British government insists on the need to regain its sovereignty and regain control when the EU doesn't want a deal at any cost.

As this week turns out to be decisive, Boris Johnson is once again bringing the highly controversial UK internal market bill to the House of Commons. It partly returns to the divorce agreement signed between London and Brussels and in particular to the Irish protocol intended to avoid the appearance of a physical border between Ireland and Northern Ireland, whatever the terms of exit from UE. These provisions aim to preserve the Good Friday agreement that ended 30 years of civil war. This bill was strongly condemned domestically and internationally and rejected by the UK upper House. The EU has launched legal proceedings against the UK and said it will not sign a deal if the divorce Treaty is not respected.

Time is running out to find an agreement and limit the impact on growth, which will be significant in any case

The British government also wants to introduce a tax bill on Wednesday that also goes against the Irish protocol. Tensions between London and Brussels will therefore increase at a crucial point in the negotiations.

Strong disruptions are to be expected even in the event of an agreement

On December 31st at midnight, the UK will exit the single market and the European customs union, implying a loss of fluidity in the trade of goods and services and ending the free movement of people, with its main trading partner. Border controls will then be introduced, generating additional costs and increased delivery times. The Covid-19 epidemic has also delayed preparations for Brexit, in particular with regard to the mechanism to comply with the Irish protocol. The National Audit Office has signaled that trade relations between UK and EU will experience serious disruption from January 1, with significant risks to the arrangement to comply with the Irish protocol.

Strong impact of Brexit on growth

Brexit will take place as the British economy is one of the most affected by the Covid-19 crisis. The UK experienced its deepest recession in just over 300 years in the first half of the year and is facing a second wave of the epidemic. The Office for Budget Responsibility has just released a report. Its conclusions are in line with the average of previous studies carried out. A Brexit with a trade deal has an estimated impact of -4% on average on long term UK growth. A Brexit without a trade deal (« hard Brexit ») weighs 6% on it in the long term. In the short term, in the event of a hard Brexit, GDP would contract by an additional 2%.

Without a trade deal, trade will be subject to the rules of the World Trade Organization, which will result in increased tariffs and non-tariff barriers. This will particularly penalize sectors that were relatively less affected during the Covid-19 crisis. To the rise in customs tariffs will be added a marked depreciation of the pound which will result in higher inflation likely to weigh on the purchasing power of households. In the long term, potential growth will be affected by lower productivity, linked to the decline in foreign direct investment and lower trade, and lower growth in the working population, following lower migratory flows from the European Union.

Time is running out to find an agreement and limit the impact on growth, which will be significant in any case.

Aline Goupil-Raguénès
Developed Countries Strategist

Market review

The shadow of a doubt

The end of the year is usually favorable to risky assets and this year, however very unusual, is no exception. The outperformance of equity and credit markets appears fueled by the dollar's fall, which is the distinctive feature of the reflation trade across financial markets.

In a three-speed world, Asia is well ahead in this cycle. The Chinese economy has been on a solid growth path since last spring. The yuan is gradually appreciating (6,53 vs. the US dollar) pulling most Asian currencies in its path. The move away from a dollar-dominated world to a yuan-based one is still remote, but the yuan may gain importance much faster than the 2030 deadline fo full convertibility would suggest. Across the pacific, the US has, as always, chosen economic growth over public health considerations, as the pandemic situation appears out of control. ISM surveys still point to a economic expansion but the deterioration of the sanitary backdrop will undoubtedly weigh on activity in months ahead. Employment is still growing at as solid pace with 344k new private-sector jobs added in November. Unemployment rate has dipped below 7% after a peak near 14% as the start of the pandemic. A fiscal plan worth $908b may be adopted by the US Congress. The House democrats' proposal includes $160b funding for local governments, $180b for federal unemployment benefit schemes and $288b to maintain the Paycheck Protection Program along with bailout funds for the transport (airlines) industry hit hardest by the pandemic. The Europe is treading water as political shenanigans threatening the adoption of the multi-year EU budget, including the €750b recovery fund. Poland and Hungary have maintained their vetoes on the budget agreement just a few days as the EU summit looms later this week. In parallel, Brexit negotiations appear to be going nowhere although an 11th hour mini deal might still be possible. Against this backdrop, the ECB will have no choice this week but to ease policy further.

The heterogeneity in economic growth cycles is in stark contrast with the global reflation trade at paly across world financial markets. The upturn in US yields gathered pace last week as t-note yields came close to the 1% threshold. The market may be testing the Fed's willingness to let yields drift higher. The yield curve steepened last week. Demand for mortgage credit is indeed so strong that significant paying interest is pulling rates higher. Yield targeting similar to the BoJ's experiment of yield curve control could be a way to limit balance sheet expansion whilst maintain the curve steep. Operation twist is another possibility. The option to be chosen by Fed policymakers will also depend on the size of the fiscal stimulus to come and the Treasury's strategy to refinance outstanding Treasury bills. Ten-year breakevens rose markedly last week by a whopping 12bp to 1.90% in the wake of higher oil prices as OPEC+ struck a deal to limit output growth to 500kbpd. In the euro area, the ECB meeting is this week's market mover. The Bank may lower its growth projections and keep inflation forecasts low. The ECB will likely expand the PEPP by 300-500b over 6 to 12 months beyond the current deadline of June 2021 and may offer two additional TLTROs in the second half of 2021. The announced easing may further extend the rally in sovereign spreads. Indeed, Italian BTPs now trade within 120bp with Iberian debt yields on 10-year maturities hovering about 0%. The long peripheral bond consensus may however limit the upside from here.

We have observed a sharp richening in valuations in high yield space of late. Despite Moody's forecasts of 6% default rate over 12 months sometime next spring, speculative-grade spreads have shrunk by a further 18bp last week to 353bp. The iTraxx Crossover is indeed trading within 240bp even as the current rating composition of the CDX market index would require a spread of 249pb at the minimum to compensate investors for historical average default risk. Investment grade corporate bonds in the euro area is also rallying, especially the financial sector, in spite of ongoing outflows from credit funds. New issue premiums have been quite reduced in the latest deals. In equity market space, the energy sector (+10.4% last week) helped by the OPEC+ deal and financials pulled indices higher last week. The rebound in banking stocks is traceable to rumors hinting at the possibility to pay dividends worth 15-25% of net income next year. The banking sector supervisor (the ECB) poured some cold water on such expectations late last week but hinting at another 6-month period of reduced payouts.

Axel Botte
Global strategist

What to watch for next week

- ECB : further easing measures expected.
- Brexit, EU summit and US fiscal deal.

Main market indicators

G4 Government Bonds	07-Dec-20	-1wk (bp)	-1m (bp)	YTD (bp)
EUR Bunds 2y	-0.76 %	-2	+2	-16
EUR Bunds 10y	-0.58%	-1	+4	-40
EUR Bunds 2s10s	18 bp	+0	+2	-24
USD Treasuries 2y	0.14 %	-1	-1	-143
USD Treasuries 10y	0.93 %	+10	+12	-98
USD Treasuries 2s10s	79 bp	+10	+13	+44
GBP Gilt 10y	0.28 %	-2	+1	-54
JPY JGB 10y	0.02 %	-1	+0	+3
€ Sovereign Spreads (10y)	07-Dec-20	-1wk (bp)	-1m (bp)	YTD (bp)
France	24 bp	0	-2	-6
Italy	119 bp	-1	-7	-41
Spain	64 bp	-2	-8	-2
Inflation Break-evens (10y)	07-Dec-20	-1wk (bp)	-1m (bp)	YTD (bp)
EUR OATi (9y)	69 bp	+10	+28	-
USD TIPS	190 bp	+11	+24	+12
GBP Gilt Index-Linked	322 bp	+11	+13	+11
EUR Credit Indices	07-Dec-20	-1wk (bp)	-1m (bp)	YTD (bp)
EUR Corporate Credit OAS	92 bp	-1	-22	-1
EUR Agencies OAS	41 bp	-2	-8	-3
EUR Securitized - Covered OAS	33 bp	-2	-5	-9
EUR Pan-European High Yield OAS	353 bp	-18	-108	+49
EUR/USD CDS Indices 5y	07-Dec-20	-1wk (bp)	-1m (bp)	YTD (bp)
iTraxx IG	47 bp	-2	-3	+3
iTraxx Crossover	243 bp	-22	-51	+37
CDX IG	51 bp	0	0	+6
CDX High Yield	294 bp	-11	-34	+14
Emerging Markets	07-Dec-20	-1wk (bp)	-1m (bp)	YTD (bp)
JPM EMBI Global Div. Spread	358 bp	-20	-52	+67
Currencies	07-Dec-20	-1wk (%)	-1m (%)	YTD (%)
EUR/USD	$1.214	+1.55	+2.71	+8.1
GBP/USD	$1.333	-0.18	+1.43	+0.5
USD/JPY	¥103.99	+0.29	+1.41	+4.41
Commodity Futures	07-Dec-20	-1wk ($)	-1m ($)	YTD ($)
Crude Brent	$48.9	$1.0	$9.1	-$11.6
Gold	$1 867.5	$89.4	$5.2	$344.7
Equity Market Indices	07-Dec-20	-1wk (%)	-1m (%)	YTD (%)
S&P 500	3 697	2.08	5.35	14.43
EuroStoxx 50	3 526	0.96	10.05	-5.85
CAC 40	5 567	0.88	12.22	-6.88
Nikkei 225	26 547	0.43	9.14	12.22
Shanghai Composite	3 417	0.73	3.15	12.02
VIX - Implied Volatility Index	21.72	5.59	-12.63	57.62

Source: Bloomberg, Ostrum Asset Management

Additional notes

Ostrum Asset Management

Asset management company regulated by AMF under n° GP-18000014 – Limited company with a share capital of 48 518 602 €. Trade register n°525 192 753 Paris – VAT : FR 93 525 192 753 – Registered Office: 43, avenue Pierre Mendès-France, 75013 Paris – www.ostrum.com

This document is intended for professional, in accordance with MIFID. It may not be used for any purpose other than that for which it was conceived and may not be copied, distributed or communicated to third parties, in part or in whole, without the prior written authorization of Ostrum Asset Management.

None of the information contained in this document should be interpreted as having any contractual value. This document is produced purely for the purposes of providing indicative information. This document consists of a presentation created and prepared by Ostrum Asset Management based on sources it considers to be reliable.

Ostrum Asset Management reserves the right to modify the information presented in this document at any time without notice, which under no circumstances constitutes a commitment from Ostrum Asset Management.

The analyses and opinions referenced herein represent the subjective views of the author(s) as referenced, are as of the date shown and are subject to change without prior notice. There can be no assurance that developments will transpire as may be forecasted in this material. This simulation was carried out for indicative purposes, on the basis of hypothetical investments, and does not constitute a contractual agreement from the part of Ostrum Asset Management.

Ostrum Asset Management will not be held responsible for any decision taken or not taken on the basis of the information contained in this document, nor in the use that a third party might make of the information. Figures mentioned refer to previous years. Past performance does not guarantee future results. Any reference to a ranking, a rating or an award provides no guarantee for future performance and is not constant over time. Reference to a ranking and/or an award does not indicate the future performance of the UCITS/AIF or the fund manager.

Under Ostrum Asset Management's social responsibility policy, and in accordance with the treaties signed by the French government, the funds directly managed by Ostrum Asset Management do not invest in any company that manufactures, sells or stocks anti-personnel mines and cluster bombs.

Final version dated xx/xx/XXX

Natixis Investment Managers

This material has been provided for information purposes only to investment service providers or other Professional Clients, Qualified or Institutional Investors and, when required by local regulation, only at their written request. This material must not be used with Retail Investors.

In the E.U. (outside of the UK and France): Provided by Natixis Investment Managers S.A. or one of its branch offices listed below.

Natixis Investment Managers S.A. is a Luxembourg management company that is authorized by the Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier and is incorporated under Luxembourg laws and registered under n. B 115843. Registered office of Natixis Investment Managers S.A.: 2, rue Jean Monnet, L-2180 Luxembourg, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. Italy: Natixis Investment Managers S.A., Succursale Italiana (Bank of Italy Register of Italian Asset Management Companies no 23458.3). Registered office: Via Larga, 2 - 20122, Milan, Italy. Germany: Natixis Investment Managers S.A., Zweigniederlassung Deutschland (Registration number: HRB 88541). Registered office: Im Trutz Frankfurt 55, Westend Carrée, 7. Floor, Frankfurt am Main 60322, Germany. Netherlands: Natixis Investment Managers, Nederlands (Registration number 50774670). Registered office: Stadsplateau 7, 3521AZ Utrecht, the Netherlands. Sweden: Natixis Investment Managers, Nordics Filial (Registration number 516405-9601 - Swedish Companies Registration Office). Registered office: Kungsgatan 48 5tr, Stockholm 111 35, Sweden. Spain: Natixis Investment Managers, Sucursal en España. Serrano n°90, 6th Floor, 28006, Madrid, Spain. In France: Provided by Natixis Investment Managers International – a portfolio management company authorized by the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (French Financial Markets Authority - AMF) under no. GP 90-009, and a public limited company (société anonyme) registered in the Paris Trade and Companies Register under no. 329 450 738. Registered office: 43 avenue Pierre Mendès France, 75013 Paris. In Switzerland: Provided for information purposes only by Natixis Investment Managers, Switzerland Sàrl, Rue du Vieux Collège 10, 1204 Geneva, Switzerland or its representative office in Zurich, Schweizergasse 6, 8001 Zürich. In the U.K.: Provided by Natixis Investment Managers UK Limited which is authorised and regulated by the UK Financial Conduct Authority (register no. 190258). This material is intended to be communicated to and/or directed at persons (1) in the United Kingdom, and should not to be regarded as an offer to buy or sell, or the solicitation of any offer to buy or sell securities in any other jurisdiction than the United Kingdom; and (2) who are authorised under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000); or are high net worth businesses with called up share capital or net assets of at least £5 million or in the case of a trust assets of at least £10 million; or any other person to whom the material may otherwise lawfully be distributed in accordance with the FSMA 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 or the FSMA 2000 (Promotion of Collective Investment Schemes) (Exemptions) Order 2001 (the "Intended Recipients"). The fund, services or opinions referred to in this material are only available to the Intended Recipients and this material must not be relied nor acted upon by any other persons. Registered Office: Natixis Investment Managers UK Limited, One Carter Lane, London, EC4V 5ER. In the DIFC: Provided in and from the DIFC financial district by Natixis Investment Managers Middle East (DIFC Branch) which is regulated by the DFSA. Related financial products or services are only available to persons who have sufficient financial experience and understanding to participate in financial markets within the DIFC, and qualify as Professional Clients or Market Counterparties as defined by the DFSA. No other Person should act upon this material. Registered office: Office 603 - Level 6, Currency House Tower 2, PO Box 118257, DIFC, Dubai, United Arab Emirates. In Japan: Provided by Natixis Investment Managers Japan Co., Ltd., Registration No.: Director-General of the Kanto Local Financial Bureau (kinsho) No. 425. Content of Business: The Company conducts discretionary asset management business and investment advisory and agency business as a Financial Instruments Business Operator. Registered address: 1-4-5, Roppongi, Minato-ku, Tokyo. In Taiwan: Provided by Natixis Investment Managers Securities Investment Consulting (Taipei) Co., Ltd., a Securities Investment Consulting Enterprise regulated by the Financial Supervisory Commission of the R.O.C. Registered address: 34F., No. 68, Sec. 5, Zhongxiao East Road, Xinyi Dist., Taipei City 11065, Taiwan (R.O.C.), license number 2018 FSC SICE No. 024, Tel. +886 2 8789 2788. In Singapore: Provided by

www.ostrum.com

An affiliate of: NATIXIS INVESTMENT MANAGERS