

OSTRUM PERSPECTIVES
APRIL 2022

Conclusions from the monthly strategy investment committee



## THE CIO LETTER

#### Growth vs. inflation

Inflation in both the United States and Europe continues to surprise on the rise and signs of sustainability are accumulating: expectations of inflation are up, inflationary pressures that are spreading over many sectors and especially pressures on wages. If the story is easier to tell about the United States than about the Eurozone, the trend is also emerging even if, as usual, the trend is delayed and attenuated.

Central banks are therefore obliged to react in particular so that expectations do not become too high. The Fed and the ECB have hardened the tone significantly and are accelerating the monetary tightening with, as a corollary, a rise in the yield curve and a strong rebound in volatility. The problem is that with current inflation levels, a return to 2%, the target of the Fed and the ECB, would require even greater policy rate hikes than the market expects (for the moment, the expected real rates remain negative over several years, which is not enough to really fight against inflation). Such a tightening would most likely lead to a recession.

This is the central banks dilemma: growth versus inflation. It is now unlikely that they will be able to control inflation without having to implement a policy that leads to a recession.

The Ukrainian tragedy adds to this dilemma by weighing on growth and adding to inflationary pressures. The key variable here is the duration of the conflict which unfortunately drags on and thus exacerbates the impact on economic variables. Not to mention the human tragedy.

Two scenarios then emerge. The first, if we are to believe the rhetoric of the central banks, with inflation returning to the target, but in this case high policy rates and most likely a recession. The second, with central banks becoming more complacent when growth falls too much; in this case the rate hikes anticipated by the market would be excessive, a recession could be avoided but inflation would stabilize at a level well above 2%.

Rather, on the second scenario, central banks have shown their risk aversion to growth.



Ibrahima Kobar CIO Ostrum



## **ECONOMIC VIEWS**

#### THREE THEMES FOR THE MARKETS



## **MONETARY POLICY**

The very sharp acceleration of the necessary in view of inflation. The impact on growth remains as economies falter. The risk of "too fast too strong" after too much

This can lead to a downward reconsideration of the tightening.

monetary tightening was

procrastination is certain.



## **INFLATION**

The red thread for over a year for markets that have continued to be surprised by the upside.

Signs of impact on growth are multiplying and we are passing the point where inflation becomes recessive and therefore deflationary. The main issue in Europe is the possible emergence of a price/wage loop that would continue the pressures.



## **GROWTH**

The headwinds are multiplying. Inflationary shock that negatively impacts the disposable income of households, the monetary tightening, the impact of the war in Ukraine that unfortunately lasts, but also the lockdown in China.

The slowdown is inevitable, the risk of recession is growing rapidly.

		2022 expectations									
	Growth (yearly average)					Inflation (CPI)					
	2021	Bloomberg Consensus			Ostrum		Bloomberg Consensus			Ostrum	
		Forecast	3 month change		Forecast	Gap to consensus	Forecast	3 month change		Forecast	Gap to consensus
World	5.8	3.5	-0.8	4			5.8	1.7	1		
USA	5.7	3.2	-0.6	•	3.0	-0.2	6.9	2.3	1	6.5	-0.4
Euro Area	5.2	2.9	-1.2	•	2.2	-0.7	6.4	3.6	1	6.4	0.0
UK	7.2	3.9	-0.9	•	2.9	-1.0	6.9	2.6	1	7.0	0.2
Japan	1.7	2.2	-0.7	•	1.0	-1.2	1.5	0.7	1	1.5	0.0
China	8.1	5.0	-0.2	•	5.0	0.0	2.2	0.0	=	1.7	-0.5


Source: Bloomberg & Ostrum





#### **KEY MACROECONOMIC SIGNPOSTS**

The global economy is experiencing four types of shocks at the beginning of 2022.

- The first is energy. The graph at the bottom right for France indicates that an energy shock is generally associated with a period of strong slowdown in activity or even a recession. The price of energy is higher now when you take into account electricity and gas prices. For the US, the rise in the price of oil in constant dollars is less marked than for Europe. The reduced parity of the euro is penalizing.
- A shock of uncertainty mainly in Europe. The invasion of Ukraine by Russia blurs the horizon, thus risking inducing economic actors to postpone spending and/or investment decisions.
  - The combination of the two is very detrimental for Europe since its supply of fossil fuels is dependent on Russia.
  - It must therefore face a very high energy price and a change in its supplies with a risk of rationing. Germany is experiencing this. After the decline in GDP in Q4 2021, IFO is also suggesting a decline in Q1 2022. The weak German economy in the midst of reconstruction will weigh on the economic situation and the pace of activity in the Eurozone.
- The third shock is the sharp slowdown in the Chinese economy. The pandemic is crippling the Middle Kingdom economy. The impulse effect on the global economy will be very limited and production processes will be penalized.












## **KEY MACROECONOMIC SIGNPOSTS**

- The fourth shock is monetary. Central banks are facing a very high inflation rate. In March, it was 7.5% in the Eurozone and 8.5% in the US. Central banks cannot accept this.
- However, the situation is not comparable in the US and the Eurozone.
  - In the Eurozone, inflation is mainly associated with the price of energy (and to some extent with food prices). Tensions within the internal economy are not very great. The 7.5% of inflation is divided into 5.5% on energy and food and 2% on goods and services (underlying index). By hardening the tone, the ECB takes the risk of weighing on domestic activity but without noticeable effects on energy prices.
  - In the USA, the picture is reversed. Inflation is closely linked to internal tensions, including high wage increases (which is not seen in Europe). The Fed can very quickly harden the tone to change the pace of underlying inflation. They're going to do that.
- The central bankers' problem is that of a trade-off between a risk of persistent inflation with a price-wage loop (US example) and a risk of recession. Experience shows that it is very damaging to have persistent inflation. This is why the Fed will intervene harshly even if it creates a strong risk of recession. In the Eurozone, the ECB wants to limit the risk of inflation expectations forming over time at the risk of creating persistence. That is why it will harden the tone very quickly even if it is not on the same scale as across the Atlantic.









## **BUDGETARY POLICY**

## The return of political risk



#### « BUILD BACK BETTER » AGAIN?

The acceleration of US inflation is undermining J. Biden's popularity rating, which has fallen in recent months, even though the unemployment rate has gradually receded. Almost two-thirds of Americans disapprove of his management of the economy. His mistake was not to get the Congress to adopt the "Build Back Better", his vast plan of social reforms. His two predecessors saw their parties lose control of the House, and J. Biden could suffer the same fate.



#### **BUDGETARY FRAGILITY OF FRANCE**


The high indebtedness of the country, which had been hidden until now, could accentuate the upward tensions on French interest rates in the event of Le Pen's victory. Indeed, public debt has risen from 97% in 2019 to 115% of GDP in 2020, linked to the pandemic. However, compared with the other Member States, its primary deficit was -1.7% of GDP, compared with -0.8% for Spain and -0.2% for Belgium. The other countries were in surplus. The interest rate differential with Germany could diverge (Italy bis?) reflecting the loss of investor confidence. The apparent debt rate would rise, increasing debt servicing, the public deficit and the level of debt over GDP.




ASSET MANAGEMENT

## TOWARDS A POOLING OF DEBT (DETAILS)

To finance the investments necessary for EU's independence on Russian energy and the strengthening of European defense capabilities, the European Union can reallocate some funds of Next Generation EU (€220 billions) and has the structural funds (€350 billions). However, this will not be enough. According to Mario Draghi, 1,500 to 2,000 billion euros are needed to finance these investments. Discussions are under way for a new massive European joint financing.





## **MONETARY POLICY**

#### The Fed roars, the ECB is expected at the turn and the PBoC remains zen



#### THE FED BECOMES MORE VOCAL

In the face of accelerating US inflation, the Fed has raised its voice. Minutes confirmed more aggressive Fed fund rate hikes (50bps) as early as the next FOMC on May 4th. The reduction of its balance sheet will begin in May. The wage-price loop is racing and the Fed does not want to take the risk that it will settle permanently. The Fed does not want to lose face with inflation, but only 6 FOMC remain to act. Towards 5% Fed fund rates, as Larry Summers mentioned?



#### THE ECB IS EXPECTED AT THE TURN


After several meetings which had surprised the market with a more restrictive speech than expected, the ECB, during its meeting of April 14, was much more cautious. Admittedly, the end of QE is confirmed for Q3 and rate hikes to return to 0% are very likely. But with an economy that seems to be suffering more and more, the ECB's room for maneuver is shrinking despite the level of inflation. The volume of rate increases expected by the market seems excessive to us, particularly over next year when rates are expected by the market to be around 1.1/2%.



ASSET MANAGEMENT

## A GROWING FED/PBoC DIVERGENCE

The interest rate differential between the United States and China quickly narrowed, with a negative 10-year interest rate differential on 11 April for the first time since 2010. The latter should continue to expand and risk generating outflows of capital putting under pressure local rates and the Chinese currency.





## STRATEGIC VIEWS

## Bump or long-term trend

# Strat

#### Synthetic market views: Uncertainties and Momentum

Inflationary pressures and the central banks that are driving their message have led to rates that, on the long end, have exceeded our year-end target. Is this a new trend with rates permanently on the rise? In the short term, momentum remains strong, but we think that this is more of a temporary episode, growth prospects should help lower rates towards our targets.

At the same time, the lack of visibility maintaining volatility in markets and risky assets tend to suffer, we are very cautious in the short term on credit and equities.

#### Allocation recommendations: The Trend is Our Friend

We remain underweight on nominal rates as all the conditions are in place in the short term for the trend to continue with in particular an overweight in inflation where we feel market expectations are insufficient. We remain underweight on credit with HY in particular expected to suffer. Finally, on equities, if we remain confident in the medium term, a correction is possible in the shorter term.



15/04/2022

# STRATEGIC VIEWS - ASSET CLASSES - 1/2

#### **G4** rates



The Federal Reserve has pre-announced its balance sheet reduction from May and is waving the risk of 50bp hikes. Inflation and growth argue for a short position in Treasuries.



The ECB confirms a hawkish policy stance in response to inflation despite a likely cyclical downturn ahead.

Still, April maturities may be supportive of bond markets.



The BoE will continue to tighten its monetary policy, as the Gilt follows the global bond rout. In Japan, neutrality is still warranted given YCC support from the BoJ around the upper limit of 0.25%.

## Other sovereigns



French spreads reflect uncertainty about the outcome of the presidential elections with an asymmetric risk profile in the event of Le Pen's victory. This encourages us to underweight the OAT.



Italy's debt widened beyond 165 bps as risk aversion picked up in April. Reduced ECB purchases should fuel volatility.



Duration positioning remains short in the G10 universe given the hawkish turn of the Central Banks. In Australia, the short position is less pronounced, as the RBA may react less strongly than the market expects.

#### **Inflation**



Inflation (8.5% in March) remains very high in the United States. The Fed's monetary tightening should nevertheless weigh on inflation breakevens. We opt for neutrality.



Euro area inflation is at an historic high of 7.5% in March. The ECB is concerned about inflation. Demand for inflation-linked bonds remains well oriented, due to the high carry until May.



In the United Kingdom, upside surprises on prices followed one another to the benefit of linker holders. However, the markets already seem to price in high inflation over the medium term. Neutrality prevails.



# STRATEGIC VIEWS - ASSET CLASSES - 2/2

#### Credit



IG spreads are likely to continue to widen in the near term, given higher risk aversion and fears of an economic slowdown. Flows will provide shortterm support, but the APP runs out in June.



The primary market reopened with high new issue premiums. However, there is a risk of decompression as risk-free yields rise.



Sentiment deteriorated in high yield markets, despite the default rate still at an all-time low. The shutdown of the primary market for 6 weeks implies a risk of supply congestion in the months to come.

#### Stock market



Economic growth presents downside risks given the war in Ukraine. Annual EPS growth is limited to 0/+2%. Lack of visibility is an obstacle to performance.



Inflationary pressures (logistics, raw materials, recruitment) may impact profit margins. The low visibility should benefit the quality factor.



We remain cautious in the short term, targeting a decline towards 3,750 on the Euro Stoxx 50. The evolution of the war and monetary tightening will dictate investor sentiment.

#### **Emerging**



The EMBIGD spread should move in a range of 390-440 bps. We remain cautious, as the decline in the spread observed is linked to the exit of Russia and Belarus from the index.



The two catalysts for the asset class, namely the state of global growth and accommodative financial conditions, are fading.



Countries that have macroeconomic discipline and that are net exporters of commodities should hold up better.



# **MARKET VIEWS**

## **Asset classes**

			Fore	cast
		14-Apr-22	May-22	Dec-22
Sovereigns				
USA	Fed Funds	0.50	0.50	2.00
	10-year	2.83	2.90	2.25
UK	10-year	1.89	2.00	
Japan	10-year	0.23	0.25	
Euro Area	BCE, deposit	-0.50	-0.50	0.00
Germany	2-year	0.05		
	10-year	0.84	1.00	0.50
	30-year	1.02		
France	10-year	1.33		1.00
	Spread	49	40/100	50
Italy	10-year	2.48		2.30
	Spread	164	160/190	180
Spain	10-year	1.78	1.95	1.45
	Spread	94	95	95
Portugal	10-year	1.84	2.00	1.35
	Spread	99	100	85

		Forecast	
	14-Apr-22	May-22	Dec-22
Credit / Spreads			
Euro Inflation Swap 10-ans	2.88	2.9/2.95	2.50
Libor OAS Spreads			
IG .	61	65	85-90
HY	346	370	405-415
EMBI Spread	404	390-440	400-425
FX			
EUR/USD	1.08	1.07	1.15
Stock market			
S&P 500	4393		
Euro Stoxx	3849	3750	4050
FTSE 100	7616		
Commodities / Volatility			
Brent Oil Prices	111.33	100	80
Gold	1974	1900	1900
VIX	22.70		20/35



#### **Additional notes**

#### **Ostrum Asset Management**

Asset management company regulated by AMF under n° GP-18000014 – Limited company with a share capital of 48 518 602 €. Trade register n°525 192 753 Paris – VAT : FR 93 525 192 753 – Registered Office: 43, avenue Pierre Mendès-France, 75013 Paris – www.ostrum.com

This document is intended for professional, in accordance with MIFID. It may not be used for any purpose other than that for which it was conceived and may not be copied, distributed or communicated to third parties, in part or in whole, without the prior written authorization of Ostrum Asset Management.

None of the information contained in this document should be interpreted as having any contractual value. This document is produced purely for the purposes of providing indicative information. This document consists of a presentation created and prepared by Ostrum Asset Management based on sources it considers to be reliable.

Ostrum Asset Management reserves the right to modify the information presented in this document at any time without notice, which under no circumstances constitutes a commitment from Ostrum Asset Management.

The analyses and opinions referenced herein represent the subjective views of the author(s) as referenced, are as of the date shown and are subject to change without prior notice. There can be no assurance that developments will transpire as may be forecasted in this material. This simulation was carried out for indicative purposes, on the basis of hypothetical investments, and does not constitute a contractual agreement from the part of Ostrum Asset Management.

Ostrum Asset Management will not be held responsible for any decision taken or not taken on the basis of the information contained in this document, nor in the use that a third party might make of the information. Figures mentioned refer to previous years. Past performance does not guarantee future results. Any reference to a ranking, a rating or an award provides no guarantee for future performance and is not constant over time. Reference to a ranking and/or an award does not indicate the future performance of the UCITS/AIF or the fund manager.

Under Ostrum Asset Management's social responsibility policy, and in accordance with the treaties signed by the French government, the funds directly managed by Ostrum Asset Management do not invest in any company that manufactures, sells or stocks anti-personnel mines and cluster bombs.

Final version dated 15/04/2022



#### **Natixis Investment Managers**

This material has been provided for information purposes only to investment service providers or other Professional Clients, Qualified or Institutional Investors and, when required by local regulation, only at their written request. This material must not be used with Retail Investors.

In the E.U. (outside of the UK and France): Provided by Natixis Investment Managers S.A. or one of its branch offices listed below. Natixis Investment Managers S.A. is a Luxembourg management company that is authorized by the Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier and is incorporated under Luxembourg laws and registered under n. B 115843. Registered office of Natixis Investment Managers S.A.; 2, rue Jean Monnet, L-2180 Luxembourg, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. Italy: Natixis Investment Managers S.A., Succursale Italiana (Bank of Italy Register of Italian Asset Management Companies no 23458.3). Registered office: Via San Clemente 1, 20122 Milan, Italy. Germany: Natixis Investment Managers S.A., Zweigniederlassung Deutschland (Registration number: HRB 88541). Registered office: Im Trutz Frankfurt 55, Westend Carrée, 7. Floor, Frankfurt am Main 60322, Germany. Netherlands: Natixis Investment Managers, Nederlands (Registration number 50774670). Registered office: Stadsplateau 7, 3521AZ Utrecht, the Netherlands. Sweden: Natixis Investment Managers, Nordics Filial (Registration number 516405-9601 - Swedish Companies Registration Office). Registered office: Kungsgatan 48 5tr, Stockholm 111 35, Sweden. Spain: Natixis Investment Managers, Sucursal en España. Serrano n°90, 6th Floor, 28006, Madrid, Spain. Belgium: Natixis Investment Managers S.A., Belgian Branch, Gare Maritime, Rue Picard 7, Bte 100, 1000 Bruxelles, Belgium.

In France: Provided by Natixis Investment Managers International – a portfolio management company authorized by the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (French Financial Markets Authority - AMF) under no. GP 90-009, and a public limited company (société anonyme) registered in the Paris Trade and Companies Register under no. 329 450 738. Registered office: 43 avenue Pierre Mendès France, 75013 Paris.

In Switzerland: Provided for information purposes only by Natixis Investment Managers, Switzerland Sarl, Rue du Vieux Collège 10, 1204 Geneva, Switzerland or its representative office in Zurich, Schweizergasse 6, 8001 Zürich.

In the British Isles: Provided by Natixis Investment Managers UK Limited which is authorised and regulated by the UK Financial Conduct Authority (register no. 190258) registered office: Natixis Investment Managers UK Limited, One Carter Lane, London, EC4V 5ER. When permitted, the distribution of this material is intended to be made to persons as described as follows: in the United Kingdom: this material is intended to be communicated to and/or directed at investment professionals and professional investors only; in Ireland: this material is intended to be communicated to and/or directed at only financial services providers which hold a license from the Guernsey Financial Services Commission; in Jersey: this material is intended to be communicated to and/or directed at professional investors only; in the Isle of Man: this material is intended to be communicated to and/or directed at only financial services providers which hold a license from the Isle of Man Financial Services Authority or insurers authorised under section 8 of the Insurance Act 2008.

In the DIFC: Provided in and from the DIFC financial district by Natixis Investment Managers Middle East (DIFC Branch) which is regulated by the DFSA. Related financial products or services are only available to persons who have sufficient financial experience and understanding to participate in financial markets within the DIFC, and qualify as Professional Clients or Market Counterparties as defined by the DFSA. No other Person should act upon this material. Registered office: Unit L10-02, Level 10, ICD Brookfield Place, DIFC, PO Box 506752, Dubai, United Arab Emirates.



In Japan: Provided by Natixis Investment Managers Japan Co., Ltd. Registration No.: Director-General of the Kanto Local Financial Bureau (kinsho) No.425. Content of Business: The Company conducts investment management business, investment advisory and agency business and Type II Financial Instruments Business Operator.

In Taiwan: Provided by Natixis Investment Managers Securities Investment Consulting (Taipei) Co., Ltd., a Securities Investment Consulting Enterprise regulated by the Financial Supervisory Commission of the R.O.C. Registered address: 34F., No. 68, Sec. 5, Zhongxiao East Road, Xinyi Dist., Taipei City 11065, Taiwan (R.O.C.), license number 2020 FSC SICE No. 025, Tel. +886 2 8789 2788.

In Singapore: Provided by Natixis Investment Managers Singapore Limited (company registration no. 199801044D) to distributors and institutional investors for informational purposes only.

In Hong Kong: Provided by Natixis Investment Managers Hong Kong Limited to institutional/ corporate professional investors only.

In Australia: Provided by Natixis Investment Managers Australia Pty Limited (ABN 60 088 786 289) (AFSL No. 246830) and is intended for the general information of financial advisers and wholesale clients only.

In New Zealand: This document is intended for the general information of New Zealand wholesale investors only and does not constitute financial advice. This is not a regulated offer for the purposes of the Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013 (FMCA) and is only available to New Zealand investors who have certified that they meet the requirements in the FMCA for wholesale investors. Natixis Investment Managers Australia Pty Limited is not a registered financial service provider in New Zealand.

In Latin America: Provided by Natixis Investment Managers S.A.

In Uruguay: Provided by Natixis Investment Managers Uruguay S.A., a duly registered investment advisor, authorised and supervised by the Central Bank of Uruguay. Office: San Lucar 1491, Montevideo, Uruguay, CP 11500. The sale or offer of any units of a fund qualifies as a private placement pursuant to section 2 of Uruguayan law 18,627.

In Colombia: Provided by Natixis Investment Managers S.A. Oficina de Representación (Colombia) to professional clients for informational purposes only as permitted under Decree 2555 of 2010. Any products, services or investments referred to herein are rendered exclusively outside of Colombia. This material does not constitute a public offering in Colombia and is addressed to less than 100 specifically identified investors.

In Mexico: Provided by Natixis IM Mexico, S. de R.L. de C.V., which is not a regulated financial entity, securities intermediary, or an investment manager in terms of the Mexican Securities Market Law (Ley del Mercado de Valores) and is not registered with the Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (CNBV) or any other Mexican authority. Any products, services or investments referred to herein that require authorization or license are rendered exclusively outside of Mexico. While shares of certain ETFs may be listed in the Sistema Internacional de Cotizaciones (SIC), such listing does not represent a public offering of securities in Mexico, and therefore the accuracy of this information has not been confirmed by the CNBV. Natixis Investment Managers is an entity organized under the laws of France and is not authorized by or registered with the CNBV or any other Mexican authority. Any reference contained herein to "Investment Managers" is made to Natixis Investment Managers and/or any of its investment management subsidiaries, which are also not authorized by or registered with the CNBV or any other Mexican authority.



The above referenced entities are business development units of Natixis Investment Managers, the holding company of a diverse line-up of specialised investment management and distribution entities worldwide. The investment management subsidiaries of Natixis Investment Managers conduct any regulated activities only in and from the jurisdictions in which they are licensed or authorized. Their services and the products they manage are not available to all investors in all jurisdictions. It is the responsibility of each investment service provider to ensure that the offering or sale of fund shares or third party investment services to its clients complies with the relevant national law.

The provision of this material and/or reference to specific securities, sectors, or markets within this material does not constitute investment advice, or a recommendation or an offer to buy or to sell any security, or an offer of any regulated financial activity. Investors should consider the investment objectives, risks and expenses of any investment carefully before investing. The analyses, opinions, and certain of the investment themes and processes referenced herein represent the views of the portfolio manager(s) as of the date indicated. These, as well as the portfolio holdings and characteristics shown, are subject to change. There can be no assurance that developments will transpire as may be forecasted in this material. The analyses and opinions expressed by external third parties are independent and does not necessarily reflect those of Natixis Investment Managers. Past performance information presented is not indicative of future performance.

Although Natixis Investment Managers believes the information provided in this material to be reliable, including that from third party sources, it does not guarantee the accuracy, adequacy, or completeness of such information. This material may not be distributed, published, or reproduced, in whole or in part.

All amounts shown are expressed in USD unless otherwise indicated.







Ostrum Asset Management

Société de gestion de portefeuille agréée par l'Autorité des marchés financiers sous le n° GP-18000014 du 7 août 2018 – Société anonyme au capital de 48 518 602 euros – 525 192 753 RCS Paris – TVA : FR 93 525 192 753 Siège social : 43, avenue Pierre Mendès-France – 75013 Paris – www.ostrum.com



